EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 A YEAR. SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.
EDITORIAL BOARD
H. W. AAxNT, CHAS. E. CLARx,
Chairman Grad. Treasurer
P. B. BUzZELL, WILLIAm F. HEALEY,
Secretary Business Manager
B. SELDEN BACON, WILLIAm B. GuMBART,
BENTON BAKER, VINCENT L. KEATING,
CLARENCE E. BARTON, MAX H. LEVINE,
JOHN F. COLLINS, CLAUDE B. MAXFIELD,
HowARD W. CURTIs, MICHAEL MOSES,
WILLIAZm W. GAGER, CARROLL R. WARD.
Published monthly during the Academic year, by THE YALE LAW JOURNAL CoMAN, INC.P. 0. Address, Drawer Q, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his
subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a con-
tinuation of the subscription is desired.
THE POWERS OF A STATE TO PUNISH FOR A NUISANCE DUE
TO ACTS IN ANOTHER STATE.
If a factory situated in New Jersey emits poisonous fumes
and gases into the state of New York, can the owner thereof be
held criminally liable in New York for maintaining a nuisance?
Under the laws now in force in the state of New York, he can
be held liable only in case his acts also constitute a crime of a
corresponding nature in the state of New Jersey.'
The necessities of the principal case make manifest the prac-
tical disadvantages of this state of the law, for acts committed in
one state may have no injurious consequences in that state, and
yet may be extremely harmful in their effects within another
state. In such a case that state in which the act is performed
has slight incentive to punish it, and the other state is powerless
'People of the State of New York z. International Nickel Co., N. Y.
L. J. Aug. 21, I914.
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to do so. In the protection of its property and citizens, no state
should be compelled to depend upon the action of any of its
sister states.2
The first question met in considering this problem is whether
one thus maintaining a nuisance in one state by acts done in
another state is punishable under criminal statutes in the usual
form referring only to "acts" as crimes. Is it an act in New York
to injure property in that state by means of fumes emitted into
the air in New Jersey? This question presents in a new form
the problem with which courts have struggled for hundreds of
years in distinguishing between actions of trespass vi et armis
and actions on the case, namely, to tell just where an act ends
and its consequences begin. It is admitted that a man need not
be personally present at a place in order to commit an act there;
as where A, standing in Illinois, shoots B in Iowa. Lord Ellen-
borough has held that firing a gun with shot into a field is a
breaking of the close3 Though doubts were originally expressed
as to whether trespass would lie for the passage of a balloon
over land,4 it has come to be regarded as the better view that
trespass quare clausum fregit will lie for causing the movement
of any solid substance over or into the plaintiff's close if there
is any physical contact or any actual injury.5 While noxious
gases may be said to be simply collections of extremely small
particles of solid matter carried along on the air, it would seem
more accurate to say that in this case there is no movement of
any solid substance, for the argument just supposed would apply
equally well to air and all gases. It is hard to see any practical
distinction between the case where a man pulls a trigger and as
a result gases in the gun expand and sent a charge of shot into the
plants on another's land, and the case where he kindles a fire in
a furnace, as a result of which poisonous fumes move against
those same plants and destroy them. To aid in the solution of
the practical problem we are now considering, there is a temp-
2In applying this principle to the Federal government, Brewer, J.,
said, "We are to find in the Constitution itself the full protection to the
Nation, and not to rest its sufficiency on either the generosity or the
neglect of any state.' South Carolina v. United States, i99 U. S. 437.
Prewitt V. Clayton, 5 J. B. Mon. 4.
'Pickering v. Rudd, i Starkie 56.
'Kenyon v. Hart, 6 B. & S. 252; S-ith v. Szith, IO Mass. 3o2; Jordan
v. Wyatt, 4 Gratt. 151; Pollock on Torts, p. 218.
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tation to hold that there is no distinction between these two
cases. However, the line must be drawn somewhere, and if the
meaning of the word "act" is to be regarded, as it has been
developed in the law, it must be held that a man commits an
act in the place to which he sends a solid substance, but that he
does not commit an act there by sending matter which is not
solid.
Admitting, then, that the defendant has committed no act in
New York by maintaining his factory in New Jersey, a second
problem is presented, namely, is it nevertheless possible for New
York to punish the defendant criminally for the effects of his
act, by means of a statute which is appropriately worded. As
between different counties in the same state, a cause of action has
been held to arise where the effects of the act cause injury.0 In
State v. Lord, 16 N. H. 357, the defendant erected a dam in
Maine which caused water to flow so as to constitute a nuisance
on the highway in New Hampshire, and the New Hampshire
court sustained an indictment. State v. Babcock, 30 N. J. L.
29, where ships had been sunk in a part of the Hudson river
which is under the jurisdiction of New York, is squarely contra.
Texas has criminally punished parties who, while in other states,
have forced papers purporting to affect the title to lands in
Texas.7 North Carolina in early days felt unable to punish the
passage in Virginia of counterfeit North Carolina money." The
better and more widely adopted rule seems to be that a state may
punish a defendant for causing injurious results within its sov-
ereignty by means of his acts committed beyond its boundaries."
The sovereignty of each state is supreme within its boundaries,
but it is not considered an invasion of that sovereignty for
another state to punish a defendant who while personally present
'Thompson v. Crocker, 9 Pick. 59; Company of Proprietors of the
Mersey and Irwell Navigation v. Douglas, 2 East 497. Contra, In Re
Eldred, 46 Wis. 530.
"Ham v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. App. 645; Hanks v. The State, 13 Tex.
App. 289.
"State v. Knight, 3 N. C. iog.
'Stillnan v. White Rock Mfg. Co., 3 Woodb. & M. 539; Commonwealth
v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cases 172; 2 Wharton on Conf. of Laws, 3d ed., pp.
16io, 1626; Cooley on Const. Lin., 4th ed., p. 165; Story on Conf. of
Laws, 4th ed., sec. 625b. Contra, State v. Carter, 27 N. J. Law 499; Clark
on Crim. Law, 2d ed., p. 419; 1 Bishop on Crinm. Law, 5th ed., p. 154.
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in the first state has committed a criminal act in that other state.
Nor is it an invasion of its sovereignty to punish a defendant
who while within it commits an extra-territorial crime, such as
treason, against another government. The principle here applied
is that it is not an invasion of sovereignty for a state to punish
a defendant who has injured it while beyond its boundaries. If
it is proper, as is universally admitted, to allow the injured state
to decide whether the defendant's act has been so injurious to it
that he should be criminally punished, it should not be considered
an invasion of sovereignty for that state to exercise the same
discretion in regard to the effects of the defendant's act. Any
distinction in this connection between the act of a party and the
effects of his act is illogical and is harmful in its results. Any
distinction here between acts and their effects would seem to have
been improperly carried into this branch of the law from the law
of pleading; for the sole consideration here is the injury to the
state, and the law constitutes that state the judge as to whether
the injury has occurred. The fact that the injury is indirect or
merely consequential cannot deprive a state of its sovereign right
to determine the fact of its occurrence.
In People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Crim. 590, two provisions of the
United States Constitution are referred to, and it is then asked
if there are not constitutional objections to the view which it is
here submitted is correct. The sixth amendment guarantees to
the accused the right of trial by a jury of the state and district
wherein the crime has been committed. Any objection based
upon this provision assumes the point at issue, for if it is possi-
ble to make the effects of an act a crime, then that crime occurs
where the effects of the act take place and the injury is done.
The second section of the fourth article guarantees to the citizens
of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the sev-
eral states. But if a crime has been committed in one state by
the citizen of another, it has been universally held that such
citizen has no immunity from punishment if he enters the state
where the crime was committed. To adopt a contrary view
would be to give him an immunity in the other state not possessed
by its own citizens; for it may safely be assumed that no state
will make the criminality of the effects of an act dependent on
where the act was committed.
It is true that one state has been granted relief against a pub-
lic nuisance situated in a second state by means of an original
COMMENT
bill in equity filed in the United States Supreme Court,10 but this
relief will be given only when the evil is of "serious magni-
tude,"'11 and leaves untouched the lesser nuisances against which
a complete legal system will enable a state to protect itself.
To attain the proficiency which is possible in a statute defining
criminal nuisances, a clause should be introduced which will
clearly include the effects within the state of an act performed
in another state.
EQUITY JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
As a general rule a court of equity will not exercise juris-
diction by way of injunction to stay proceedings in any criminal
matters, or in any case not strictly of a civil nature.1 In most
jurisdictions, however, there are well recognized exceptions to
this rule. Where a court of equity has jurisdiction first and one
of the litigants tries to defeat that jurisdiction by starting a
criminal prosecution involving the same parties on account of the
same subject matter, the criminal proceedings may be enjoined.2
But the parties and questions involved must be identical Prob-
ably the most frequent exercise of equity jurisdiction with rela-
tion to criminal proceedings is to stay prosecutions under an
invalid statute or ordinance where the complainant's property
rights are affected.- The federal courts have gone so far as
" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230.
'Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496.
'Moses v. Mayor, 52 Ala. 198; Portis v. Fall et al., 34 Ark. 375;
S ouffer & Ford v. Tipton, 142 N. W. (Iowa) 97; Kelly v. Conner,
122 Tenn. 339; High on Injunctions, 4 ed. 33; 2 Story's Equity Juris-
prudence, 12 ed. 893; Bispham's Principles of Equity, 424.
'York v. Pilkingtol, 2 Atk. 302.
'Paulk v. Mayor, 1O4 Ga. 24; Creighton v. Dahmer, 70 Miss. 6o2;
Logan v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 157 Fed. 570; Spink v. Francis,
19 Fed. 670, 2o Fed. 567; Saull v. Brown, L. R. io Ch. 64; Turner v.
Turner, 15 Jur. 218. See also extensive notes in 21 L. R. A. 84; 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 193.
'Board of Commissioners v. Orr, 61 So. (Ala.) 92o; Dreyfus v. Boone,
88 Ark. 353; Philadelphia Co. v. Dickinson, 33 App. Cas. (D. G.) 338;
Boyd v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. i99; New Orleans, etc., Co. v,. New Orleans,
1I8 La. 228, io Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 757; Clark v. Harford A & B.
Ass'n, ii8 Md. 6o8; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616; Hall
v. Jackson, 31 How. Pr. 331; Spaulding v. McNary, 130 Pac. (Ore.)
391; Cain v. Daly, 74 S. C. 480; Houston v. Richter, 157 S. W. (Tex.)
i89; Fellows v. Charleston, 62 W. Va. 665; Lindsley v. Gas Co., 162
Fed. 954.
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to enjoin prosecutions in state courts where there was a conflict
between state laws and the federal laws or constitution.5 In
some jurisdictions it is sufficient that the complainant is injuri-
ously affected by the enforcement of the invalid statute or ordi-
nance.6 On this point, O'Brien, J., in a Minnesota case,'
observed: "But in every case the probable and, we think, direct
injury to the property must be shown, entirely distinct from the
proceedings to punish personally for the commission of crime.
Such cases are considered exceptions to the general rule, and
are based upon the theory that it would be inequitable to permit
the infliction of irreparable injury pending judicial determination
whether or not a crime had been committed, or that from the
circumstances involved the property of the one prosecuted can-
not be protected by the defense he may interpose to the
accusation."
The right of a court of equity to enjoin criminal proceedings
upon any ground has been vigorously denied in some courts,
regardless of the infirmities of the ordinance or the effects of
its enforcement." It is said: "Courts of equity interpose to
prevent multiplicity of suits and vexatious litigation by private
parties who are shown to be actuated either by desire of gain
or to gratify their malice. But prosecutions in the nature of
criminal prosecutions are conducted by officers of the state rep-
resenting the public and looking to the public interests, as well
as the just punishment of the guilty, and it would not be proper
for a court of equity to undertake to restrain an officer acting
in his official capacity and under the responsibilities of his office,
from discharging what to him may appear to be a plain duty
pertaining to his office." 9 This distinction is not one of very
great weight; for if, in a particular case, it can be shown that
the elements entitling the interposition of a court of equity exist,
whether the proceedings be criminal or civil they should be
enjoined. If anything is more vexatious or harassing than civil
litigation, it is criminal litigation. The strength of the decisions
'Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123; Tuchman v. Welch, 72 Fed. 548.
'Mayor v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Clarke v. Harford A. & B. Ass'a,
supra; Bluefield %). Bluefield, 70 S. E. (W. Va.) 772; City v. Gas Co.,
132 Ind. 575.
'Cobb v. French, III Minn. 429, 432.
'Moses v. Mayor, supra; Poyer v. Village, 123 II1. III; Creighton v.
Dahmer, supra.
'Railway Co. v. Dist. of Col., 6 Mackey 570.
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in many of the cases refusing recognition of the exception to
the general rule is lessened by the adoption of the principle that
"to entitle a party to maintain a bill on this ground (to prevent
a multiplicity of suits) there must be a right claimed affecting
many persons."
The greatest departure, perhaps, from the general rule set
forth above obtains in Kentucky. Not only is a multiplicity of
prosecutions alone sufficient to sustain equity jurisdiction to
restrain criminal proceedings,1 0 but it is sufficient that there was
a misapplication of a valid statute, provided there was no appeal
from the judgment rendered. The point arose in the recent
case of Zweigart v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co." Plaintiff,
having been fined under a statute providing that "any person
who shall put any obstruction in a passway-shall be liable to a
fine of ten dollars, recoverable by warrant in the name of the
commonwealth, the fine to be laid out in repairing the pass-
way, . . ." for obstructing with its cars a passway of the defen-
dant over its right of way, and alleging the issuance of the
warrants and the fact that the defendant, unless restrained by
order of court, would cause numerous other warrants to issue
against defendant, and that such proceedings constituted a cloud
on plaintiff's title, and would seriously interfere with its right to
use and control its property, and that there was no appeal from
any judgment that might be rendered against it under the war-
rants that issued, or which the defendant was threatening to
issue, brought an action to enjoin the defendant from further
prosecuting the warrants, and for the purpose of quieting its
title to its right of way. In affirming a decree granting the
relief asked, under the authority of Shinkle v. Covington,12 the
Court af Appeals said: "While ordinarily, of course, an injunc-
tion will not lie to restrain criminal proceedings, yet where, as
in this case, plaintiff's property right is involved, and it appears
that there will be a multiplicity of suits, and irreparable injury
will follow unless the prosecution be enjoined, we conclude that
a court of equity may properly interfere.-And where the facts
are sufficient to justify the interference of a court of equity, the
court will pass on all the questions that are necessarily involved.
It is a case of conflicting easements. The easement of defend-
"South Covington, etc, Co. v. Berry, i5 L. R. A. (Ky.) 6o4.
U170 S. W. (Ky.) 1194.
-83 Ky. 420.
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ant is subordinate to that of plaintiff. Whatever obstruction
exists grows out of plaintiff's exercise of its corporate fran-
chise.-Furthermore, the statute refers to "any obstructions,"
and not to an obstruction maintained for an unreasonable length
of time.-It seems to us, therefore, that the statute does not
apply to such an obstruction." The case is distinguished from
the earlier case relied upon by the court in that a temporary
injunction was granted there, pending the establishment of the
rights of the respective parties in a court of law, whereas in
the principal case the court of equity determined the conflict of
property rights which gave rise to the criminal proceedings,
quieted title in the plaintiff, and perpetually enjoined further
proceedings of the same nature.
It appears from a number of cases, an eminent authority to
the contrary notwithstanding, 3 that the prevention of multiplicity
of suits is in itself sufficient ground for equity jurisdiction where
the relief asked is preventive in character and where all the
issues involved may be determined by the solution of one or
more questions of law; and provided also that consolidation is
not available at law, and adequate. Under all the circumstances
jurisdiction was no doubt properly exercised in the principal
case, although it can hardly be said to be the function of a court
of equity to act as an appellate court of law. Nevertheless,
when the occasion arises, as it did here, requiring relief from a
fault in the adjective law of the jurisdiction, there is no reason
why a court of equity should not grant it.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE-KNOWLEDGE OF PLAINTIFF'S DANGER.
In a recent case' it was held that the defendant under the doc-
trine of last clear chance is not liable unless he discovered the
plaintiff's danger in time to avoid injuring him by the exercise
of ordinary care. This seems to be a decision making the lia-
bility of the defendant depend upon his actual knowledge of the
plaintiff's danger and not upon the fact that he was in a position
to have such knowledge by exercising ordinary prudence and
care.
1I Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 365, 366.
'Townsend v. Butterfield, 143 Pac. (Cal.) 76o.
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The early cases 2 held, that if the plaintiff was guilty of any
negligence which contributed to his injury he could not recover
and it was not until the case of Davies v. Mann3 that the doctrine
of last clear chance was applied.
There are two theories of the doctrine, depending upon the
view different courts take of proximate cause. The first, and the
more general, is that the negligence of the plaintiff, which would
have been clearly contributory, has been rendered remote by the
intervention of a later chance, solely in the defendant, to avoid
the natural and proximate result of the plaintiff's negligence, and
the failure to exercise this last chance becomes the sole proximate
cause of the injury.- Here, proximate cause is looked upon as
the last, or final, cause of the injury. This view would seem to
reduce the doctrine to a case of negligence in which the defend-
ant, in law, is solely negligent.
The other view is the logical result of a broader definition of
proximate cause. A definition which permits "that it need not
be the nearest cause in time or place to the effect it produces."5
Under this doctrine it is clearly an exception to the rule of con-
tributory negligence. The plaintiff's negligence is admitted to be
a proximate cause of the injury but the defendant is not allowed
to set it up as a defense because, on account of his position, not-
withstahding the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, he alone
had a chance to avoid the injury when the danger was imminent.6
Under both of these views the last clear chance necessarily
implies a point of time beyond which it lies wholly within the
power of only one party to avoid the accident. During this
period, in order for the plaintiff to recover, the defendant must
have the sole power to avoid the danger by exercising reasonable
care, and he alone must be regarded as negligent during this
'Butterfield v. Forrester, ii East. 6o; Lack v. Steward, 4 C. & P. Io6;
Luxford v. Large, 5 C. & P. 421.
' Io M. & W. 546.
'Southern Ind. Ry. Co. v. Fine, 163 Ind. 617, 72 N. E. 589; Loyd v.
Albernale, etc., R. R. Co. 1II8 N. C. IOO, 24 S. E. 8o5; Nehring, etc. v.
Conn. Co., 86 Conn. iO9, 84 AtI. 3oi; Fuller v. I. C. R. R. Co., 65 So.
(Ala.) 783; Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Croly, 96 N. E.
(Ind.) 973; Herrick v. Washington Water Power Co., 134 Pac. (Wash.)
934-
'29 Cyc. 328 (c).
liland etc. Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551, p. 558; Hutchinson v.
St. Louis Ry. Co., 88 Mo. App. 376; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.
Cochran, 91 S. W. (Ark.) 747.
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period.7 The plaintiff, although negligent in creating the danger,
must during this period be powerless to avoid it and therefore all
negligence on his part must necessarily have terminated. If the
power to avert the danger existed in both until the same instant,
and in neither afterward, contributory negligence would be, with
one exception,8 a good defense.9
If during this period of last chance the defendant had actual
knowledge of the plaintiff's danger and failed to exercise ordi-
nary care to avoid it, all courts would agree in giving relief to
the plaintiff. Beyond this, however, the courts are in conflict.
One line of authorities requires actual knowledge, 10 and another
requires merely such an opportunity to have actual knowledge
that a reasonably prudent man would have had it."
No authorities need be cited for the proposition that in a case
of negligence, where the plaintiff in no way contributes to the
injury, the defendant is bound to know what a reasonably prudent
man in his position would have known. Is there any good reason
for a different rule in the case of the last clear chance? As indi-
cated above, where the doctrine is applied, the defendant must
have been the only party really negligent, during the period
immediately preceding the injury. During this period the
defendant is in a position, and has the potential power, to avoid
the injury, as a matter of fact, whether he is conscious of the
plaintiff's danger or not. Is the circumstance that the plaintiff's
negligence contributed to create the danger a sufficient reason
for relaxing the usual rule of responsibility applicable to the
defendant?
'Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Croly, 96 N. E. (Ind.) 973;
Roanoke Ry. & Electric Co. v. Carroll, 72 S. E. (Va.) 125.
'Evansville & S. I. Traction Co. v. Johnson, 97 N. E. (Ind.) 176;
Herrick v. Washington Water Power Co., supra.
9Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Croly, 96 N. E. (Ind.) 973;
Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 164 Fed. 41; Melisner v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Mont. 162, 127 Pac. 146.
0 Waterman v. Visalia Electric Ry. Co., 137 Pac. (Cal.) io96; Iowa
Cent. Ry. Co. et al. v. Walker, 2o3 Fed. 685; St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 77 Ark. 398, 91 S. W. 747; Wolf v. Chicago Great
Western Ry. Co., 147 N. W. (Iowa) gor; Zitnik v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.,
136 N. W. (Neb.) 995.
' Guenther v. St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co., io8 Mo. iS, 18 S. W. 846;
Morris v. Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co., 66 Wash. 691, 12o Pac. 534; Rush v.
Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 137 S. W. (Mo.) lo29; Roy v. Aberdeen R. R.
Co., 141 N. C. 84, 53 S. E. 622; Kinney v. St. Louis & S. R. R. Co., 133
Pac. (Okla.) i8o.
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The reason for any liability on account of negligence is based
upon public policy, which requires that life and property be pro-
tected from the careless acts of third persons. By requiring
actual knowledge in the defendant of the plaintiff's danger as a
condition precedent to the applicability of the last clear chance
rule, the courts are in effect saying that more accidents will be
avoided, and therefore life and property better protected, by not
creating the duty to discover and avoid the peril of persons who
have negligently exposed themselves to danger, than by affording
a slightly greater protection to such persons and in a measure
encouraging their negligence.
Probably the negligence of the plaintiff himself would not be
sufficiently discouraged unless a rule is adopted holding the
defendant liable only when he reasonably should from his position
have had knowledge of the plaintiff's danger, and then only in
case he failed to exercise reasonable, and not extraordinary, care
to avoid the injury. The courts are in conflict on these questions,
but the principal case would seem to be in accord with the weight
of authority.
IS CONSIDERATION NECESSARY TO MAKE A BINDING WAIVER
OF A RIGHT UNDER A CONTRACT?
In a case recently decided in the state of Washington the
plaintiff set forth in her declaration a custom on the part of the
defendant company to give their employees passes over the lines
of the company, that this custom was called to her attention
when she applied for employment, no mention being made of
any exemption of the defendant from liability for its negligence
or that of its servants and that the giving by defendant of this
pass constituted a portion of the consideration for her services.
She also averred that she worked for the defendant for a time
and then applied for a pass, and was compelled to sign a printed
request which read, "I hereby request that you deliver to me a
pass whereby I will be enabled to travel on your cars without the
payment of fare. I expressly agree, understand and acknowl-
edge that the delivery of such a pass is and will be a pure gra-
tuity on your part and supported by no consideration whatever
and that in accepting said pass I assume the risk of every injury
1Hagemait v. Puget Sound Electric Ry., 141 Pac. (Wash.) 1027.
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to person and property sustained by me howsoever caused while
riding upon cars controlled, owned or operated by you." The
pass which was issued and signed by plaintiff contained virtually
the same conditions; setting forth that it was "free," ".a pure
gratuity," and "for no consideration whatever." The complaint
concluded with an allegation of the defendant's negligence and
the resulting injury to the plaintiff. To this complaint there was
a demurrer and the majority of the court held that the demurrer
was good on the ground that the exemption of a common carrier
from liability by a gratuitous passenger is not against public pol-
icy and that the plaintiff was a gratuitous passenger because the
signing of the application for a pass was a clear waiver of her
prior contract. Three members of the court dissent on the
ground that the plaintiff had, under the contract, earned a right
to transportation; that the attempted waiver was without con-
sideration and therefore the plaintiff was a passenger for hire
and her assumption of risk contrary to public policy.
If the plaintiff in the principal case was a gratuitous passenger
the decision is clearly in accord with the authorities. 2 But if she
was at the time of the negligence complained of a passenger for
hire the decision should have been different. The soundness of
the line of argument which seeks to justify the conclusion that
the signed application for the pass and the pass itself constituted
a valid waiver of the prior contract right is, it is submitted, open
to question.
It is clear that to justify this holding that the plaintiff was a
free passenger the original contract must be gotten rid of. For
by that contract, as averred, the plaintiff gave her services in
return for the pass, and the giving of services is sufficient con-
sideration to make one a passenger for hire-as good as the giv-
ing of money.3 So the plaintiff had at one time the right to
become a passenger for hire without paying the ordinary fare.
She could not lose it merely by calling herself a free passen-
ger, as was held in the case of one tlavelling on a so-called
"drover's pass" and in other similar cases, for the court will
look behind the words and not allow one who really is a
'Griswold v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., 53 Conn. 371; Quimby v. B. & M.
R. Co., 150 Mass. 365; Perkins v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 196; Annas
v. Milwaukee & N. W. R. Co., 67 Wis. 46; McCawley v. Furness R. Co.,
L. R. 8 Q. B. 57; Hall v. N.E. R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 437.
'Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R., 166 Mass. 492; Peterson v. Seattle Traction
Co., 23 Wash. 615.
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passenger for hire to exempt the carriers merely by saying he is
a free passenger.4 The majority of the court in the principal
case hold that the plaintiff changed her status by a waiver of her
contract right while the minority say that there was no waiver.
When the court speaks of the "waiver" given by the plaintiff
they must be taken to mean that the agreement to accept a free
pass was a rescission of the prior contract. But such an agree-
ment requires on principle the same elements of mutual consent,
inteition and consideration which are required to form any valid
contract.5 In the principal case the intention of the plaintiff to
abandon her contract right may easily be implied. She could
not use two passes and can reasonably be supposed to have taken
the free pass in full satisfaction of her rights to transportation.
She did an act inconsistent with an intention to hold the defend-
ant strictly to the terms of the contract. But there at once arises
the question whether the intended agreement of the plaintiff was
based upon any consideration. Consideration is defined by
Anson as "something done, forborne, or suffered, or promised
to be done, forborne or suffered by the promisee in respect to
the promise."6  The defendant Company here did not in any
way change its position so as to bring itself within this defini-
tion-it did nothing it was not already bound to do.
But the court seems to be under the impression that no con-
sideration was needed to support the plaintiff's so-called
"waiver." All the cases, English and American, are agreed that
consideration is necessary to support the discharge of a bilat-
eral contract and this consideration is usually found in the mutual
promises to release.7 In the case of a unilateral contract there
are a few English cases which make a distinction between an
agreement to discharge made before breach and one made after
breach. The release of the primary, contractual right would
not require consideration according to this distinction, but the
release of the secondary remedial right would." There are cer-
'N. Y. C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R.
Co., supra.; Pa. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315.
5Williston's Ed. Wald's Pollock on Contracts, p. 815.
'Anson on Contracts, 2d Am. Ed., p. lOO.
"Williston's Ed. Wald's Pollock on Contracts, p. 815; Farrar v.
Toliver, 88 Ill. 4o8; King v. Gillett, 7 M. & W. 55; Saeger v. Runk, 148
Pa. St. 77; Spier v. Hyde, 78 App. Div. I5I; Anson on Contracts, 2 Am.
Ed., p. 339; Clark on Contracts, pp. 6o8-6o9; also a dictum of Baron
Parke in Foster v. Dawber, 6 Exch. 838.
'Edwards v. Weeks, 2 Mod. Rep. 259.
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tainly two early English cases decided in 1634 and 1588 which
hold that a plea of exoneration before breach was good without
any consideration. 9 Williston, relying on statements made obiter
in Edwards v. Walters0 and Dobson v. Espie" says that the Eng-
lish law still is that discharge before breach of a unilateral con-
tract may be made without consideration. Anson reaches the
opposite conclusion on the strength of a dictum of Baron Parke
in Foster v. Dawber.12  Clark in his work on Contracts agrees
with Anson. Williston however admits that there is "an absence
of any underlying principle to support the English doctrine."'13
Whhen the American authorities are considered, however, it is
found that they nearly all agree on the proposition that consid-
eration is necessary to support the discharge of a unilateral con-
tract before breach.' 4 ,These cases all hold that unless there is
consideration for the agreement to discharge it is a mere nudum
pactum. A few American cases have tended the other way, but
they fail to justify their holdings by any cogent reasoning.' 5
The principal case is analogous to the authorities cited. It is
an attempt by an obligee to do away with the obligation and cor-
relative right by an agreement without any consideration. The
want of consideration should have been held a fatal defect in the
defendant's plea of a waiver of the contract right. That is the
conclusion reached by all the American cases at least, but
the court in the principal case overlooks the whole matter of the
necessity of consideration. For this reason the opinion of the
minority seems to be better law, on reason and on precedent.
For since there was no valid waiver the-defendant was under an
obligation to accept the plaintiff as a passenger for hire, and so
when she became a passenger she could not, by merely calling
herself a gratuitous passenger, contract away her rights against
the defendant as a common carrier.
'Langden v. Stokes, Croke's Reports (Charles) 383; Conier's & Hol-
land's Case, 2 Leon. 214.
10i896, 2 Ch. 157.
112 H. & N. 79.
126 Exch. 838.
Williston's Ed. Wald's Pollocks on Contracts, p. 8ig.
"
4Allison et al. v. Abendroth, io8 N. Y. 470; Crawford v. Millspaugh,
13 Johns. 87; Saeger v. Runk, 148 Pa. St. 77; Bayley v. Buzzell, i Apple-
ton (Me.) 88; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 360.
"
1 Robinson v. Wurtz v. McFaul, 19 Mo. 549; Kelby v. Bliss, 54 Wis.
187; Hathaway v. Lynn, 75 Wis. 186.
COMMENT
EXTENT TO WHICH A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WITH A
MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETY CAN BE VARIED BY
SUBSEQUENT CHANGES IN BY-LAWS.
In an action to recover premiums on mutual benefit life insur-
ance policies in which the right to amend the by-laws of the
society was reserved and which premiums were declared for-
feited for the refusal to pay increased rates assessed after the
contract of insurance was made, it was recently held that where
the rates charged are so low that insolvency threatens the
society's existence, a by-law increasing the rates no higher than
required to carry the risks on an adequate and equitable basis is
not unreasonable and therefore not a breach of the contract.
The power of a Mutual Benefit Society to make retroactive
changes in its by-laws concerning its contracts of insurance is
uncertain. The courts are in fair agreement, as was assumed
in the principal case, that if the power is expressly reserved in
the contract, reasonable amendments may be made.' Unless
the contrary intention is clearly expressed, however, by-laws are
construed to operate prospectively only.2  Of course, if the
power has not been reserved, a subsequent change in the con-
tract cannot be made without consent.3 But there seems to be
no more definite criterion than reasonableness and in applying
this test the courts are often directly opposed in their conclusions.
Mere administrative changes in the by-laws, such as time, place
or manner of paying the premiums, may be upheld without
injustice.4 But a by-la-v limiting the time in which to file claims
and giving the society ninety days in which to adjust final benefits
was held not to limit the time for bringing suit on a policy
issued previous to the adoption of the by-law.5 The great con-
flict is concerning subsequent amendments varying the nature of
the risk or the amount of the premiums or policy. It has been
'Gilmore v. Knights of Columlns, 77 Conn. 58; Caldwell v. Grand
Lodge of United Workmen of California, 148 Cal. 195; Ross v. Modern
Brotherhood of America, 120 Iowa 692; Lange v. Royal Highlanders, 75
Neb. i88.
'Modern Woodmen of America v. Wieland, iog Ill. App. 340.
'Nat. Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Dillon, 212 Ill.
320; Fargo v. Supreme Tent, 96 (N. Y.) App. Div. 491, and cases there
cited.
'Messer z. Ancient Order of United Workmen, i8o Mass. 321.
'Cohen v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, xO5 Mich. 283.
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held that a by-law excluding saloon-keepers from membership
applied to those who then were as well as to those who should
become saloon-keepers. But a similar provision regarding car-
couplers was held not to be valid.7 A subsequent amendment
excepting suicide from the insured risks was held to prevent a
beneficiary from suing on the policy in such event." But the
same amendment was held not to prevent the beneficiary from
suing in Tennessee.' In like manner a by-law excepting suicide
while insane passed subsequent to the issuance of a policy has
been held not to apply.10 In another case, however, the same
amendment barred a recovery.1 ' Suicide, while sane, bars a
recovery anyway on the ground that it is a breach of the implied
promise that the insured will do nothing to hasten the maturity
of the policy.12 In the same way, it has been held that a benevo-
lent association can not reduce the amount of sick benefits by an
amendment passed after the sickness has occurred.'5 Yet, in
another jurisdiction the society has been allowed to limit the
number of weeks of such allowance after the disability
occurred.' Again, a mere general consent that the by-laws may
be amended has been held not to authorize a higher rate of
assessment for the reason.that it would interfere with a mem-
ber's vested right.' 5 On the other hand, Illinois holds that a
member has no vested right to insurance at a former lower
rate where he has previously given general consent to changes
in the by-laws.'6 The authorities being thus conflicting
it is permissible to consider what rule should be adopted on
principle in such cases. According to the express terms of the
contract, any subsequent amendment is assented to in advance,
but for reasons of justice and policy the courts have always con-
sidered the member to have some vested rights. These are, to
have as near as may be what he sought to get and for which he
'Ellerbe v. Faust, i19 Mo. 653.
" Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Ass'n., 82 Iowa 1O7.
'N. W. Ben. and Mut. Aid Assn. v. Warner, 24 Ill. App. 357.
'Supreme Lodge K. P. v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. 157.
" Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N. Y. 398.
"Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Fraley, 94 Tex. 200.
'Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362.
'Boultney v. Bachman, 62 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 466.
"Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Society, 82 Cal. 557.
'Strauss v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 465.
"FullenwAder v. Supreme Council Royal League, i8o Ill. 621.
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paid his money. Mere administrative changes do not prevent
this, but amendments which would deprive him altogether of
insurance, such as adding his occupation or manner of death
to the uninsured risks, are not to be upheld. An increase in the
premium or a decrease in the amount of the benefit being part
forfeitures and deprivation of the very thing sought for, and
going to the essence of the contract should not be allowed except
where otherwise a complete failure of insurance is evident, or
where insolvency threatens. The reason for the exception is
the same as for the rule, namely, to preserve the insured's invest-
ment and provision for those dependent on him, as far as may
be, in accordance with the original intention of the parties. The
principal case seems correct as illustrating the exception."'
" See also Reynolds v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 192 Mass. 150.
